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Abstract
Many people drink more than the recommended level of alcohol, with some drinking substantially more. There is evidence 
that suggests that this leads to large health and social costs, and price is often proposed as a tool for reducing consumption. 
This paper uses quantile regression methods to estimate the diferential price (and income) elasticities across the drink-
ing distribution. This is also done for on-premise (pubs, bars and clubs) and of-premise (supermarkets and shops) alcohol 
separately. In addition, we examine the extent to which drinkers respond to price changes by varying the ‘quality’ of the 
alcohol that they consume. We ind that heavy drinkers are much less responsive to price in terms of quantity, but that they 
are more likely to substitute with cheaper products when the price of alcohol increases. The implication is that price-based 
policies may have little efect in reducing consumption amongst the heaviest drinkers, provided they can switch to lower 
quality alternatives.
Keywords Alcohol demand · Quantile regression · Quality elasticity
JEL Classiication D12 · I18
Introduction
UK household expenditure on alcohol in 2014 was over 
£20 billion or around 4% of GNP. Over 500 million litres of 
pure alcohol (equivalent to approximately 2 bottles of wine 
per-adult per week) was cleared by Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs, generating over £9 billion in tax revenue [1]. 
The social cost of alcohol in the United Kingdom has been 
estimated at over £21 billion, of which £3.5 billion is attrib-
uted to health costs, £11 billion to crime, and £7 billion to 
lost productivity. The problem is not unique to the United 
Kingdom: according to World Health Organisation, alcohol 
is the second largest risk factor for disease and disability in 
Europe [2]. WHO advocates tax increase as one means of 
reducing consumption [2]. However, majority of the popu-
lation (69% of men, 84% of women [3]) drink within the 
guidelines and any price-based policy, such as tax increase, 
would have a negative efect on these people, reducing the 
consumer surplus that they enjoy. Findings in the literature 
suggest a nonlinear relationship between alcohol consump-
tion and overall mortality for both males and females [4]. 
This pattern is also found for speciic health conditions 
including liver cirrhosis [5], oral and pharyngeal cancers 
[6], and stroke [7]. Whether this nonlinearity constitutes a 
J-curve is, however, a point of debate within the scientiic 
literature (see, for example, Fillmore et al. [8] or Knott et al. 
[9]). One important parameter for policy makers, who might 
wish to reduce the overall consumption of alcohol, is the 
price elasticity of demand. However, if there is evidence 
of a nonlinear efect, then it might be possible to reduce 
harmful drinking without penalising moderate drinkers too 
greatly, providing the price elasticity was high for heavy 
drinkers and low for moderate drinkers. If that were true 
then taxation would reduce the harm on the heavy drinkers 
without imposing a large loss in consumer surplus for mod-
erate users. Thus, it is particularly important to know how 
the price elasticity of demand varies across the distribution 
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of drinking. While our prior is that heavy drinkers are likely 
to have a more inelastic demand than moderate drinkers, to 
the extent alcohol is addictive or habituating, there is little 
evidence to substantiate these priors. The theory of rational 
addiction [10] has been a major contribution to the literature 
but suggests that, for a given level of consumption, long-run 
price elasticities are lower than short-run ones. The usual 
empirical implementation of the theory is based on a very 
speciic parameterisation that does not explicitly allow the 
slope of the demand curve to vary with consumption. How-
ever, we would expect addicts (rational, or otherwise) with 
linear demand to have higher levels of consumption at any 
price so implying a lower price elasticity.
One policy option to mitigate the problem of heavy drink-
ing is minimum unit pricing, which sets a price loor for 
alcohol and so raises the price of low-priced alcohol. Since 
heavy drinkers typically purchase cheaper per unit alcoholic 
beverages (see, for example, Ludbrook et al. [11]), minimum 
unit pricing disproportionately increases the price for heav-
ier drinkers than it does for light drinkers. Scotland intro-
duced minimum unit pricing on alcohol in May 2018, with 
a loor price of 50 pence ($0.67; €0.57) per unit. Modelling 
by Brennan et al. [12] suggests that a 45 pence (US$0.60; 
€0.51) minimum unit price would afect the price of 12.5% 
of the units purchased by ‘moderate’ drinkers compared to 
30.5% of the units purchased by ‘harmful’ drinkers1. The 
price elasticities in this modelling predict that a 45 pence 
minimum unit price would decrease consumption by 0.6% 
for moderate drinkers, compared to a decrease of 3.7% 
for harmful drinkers. However, the modelling is based on 
pseudo-panel estimates that impose a constant price elastic-
ity across the drinking distribution2 [13]. If harmful drinkers 
were less price responsive than moderate drinkers, then the 
efects predicted in the modelling work will be incorrect. 
Since the marginal health and social harms are assumed to 
be increasing with consumption, the modelling work will 
thus overstate the health and social harm reduction of mini-
mum unit pricing. The contribution of this paper is that it 
examines how the response to price varies across the drink-
ing distribution using quantile regression methods. Moreo-
ver, it examines, for the irst time, how quality substitution 
difers in response to price across the drinking distribution.
The contribution of this paper is that we provide estimates, 
using quantile regression methods for both quantity and 
quality, which show that the consumption of heavy drinkers 
is less responsive to price than that of moderate drinkers. 
Moreover, we also ind that they are more likely to substitute 
with cheaper drinks when the price of alcohol increases. The 
implication, contrary to other inluential works, is that price-
based policies may have little efect in reducing consumption 
amongst the heaviest drinkers, at least when it is possible for 
them to switch to lower quality alternatives.
Background literature
There is a large literature on the price elasticity of demand of 
alcohol. Two meta-analyses have been undertaken. Gallet [14] 
includes 132 studies, and reports a median price elasticity of 
demand of − 0.535, while Wagenaar et al. [15] includes many 
of the same studies and reports a mean price elasticity of 
− 0.44. The fact that the median is greater than the mean sug-
gests that the distribution of elasticities found in the literature 
is negatively skewed. It should also be noted that the litera-
ture reviewed in the meta-analyses is varied, including studies 
looking at particular age groups (for example, adolescents).
Purshouse et al. [16] use the same underlying dataset as 
used in our own analysis to estimate price elasticities for 
use in policy simulation analysis. They estimate separate 
elasticities for moderate and harmful drinkers, and ind that 
harmful drinkers are more responsive to price changes. They 
also estimate cross-price elasticities between low- and high-
quality products within a beverage type, for example, low- 
and high-quality beer. These cross-price elasticities are very 
small, and signiicance levels are not provided. The method 
used does not account for the endogenous selection issue 
raised by Koenker and Hallock [17].
The seminal work on quantile regression in the context of 
alcohol demand was done by Manning et al. [18] which esti-
mates the price elasticity of demand for alcohol in the United 
States. However, it uses only a single cross-section of data and 
a price index (ACCRA) which is the weighted average of three 
drinks (one beer, one whisky, and one wine). The variation in 
price comes only from across the cross-section and so is entirely 
driven by diferences in the geographical location of consum-
ers—so it is not possible to separately identify price efects 
from geographical efects. While, the identiication strategy 
casts serious doubt on the interpretation of the estimated price 
elasticities, the results suggest a U-shaped relationship between 
conditional consumption decile and price elasticity, with the 
middle of the drinking distribution being most responsive to 
price changes relative to the tails of the distribution. Impor-
tantly for policy, they also ind that the elasticity estimate for 
the top conditional decile, where the very heaviest drinkers get 
most weight, is not signiicantly diferent from zero.
1 Moderate drinkers in this context are males (females) who drink 
more than 21 (14) units per week. Harmful drinkers are males 
(females) who drink more than 50 (35) units per week. A unit is equal 
to 10 ml or 8 g of pure alcohol.
2 Moreover, since this estimate comes from diferencing across the 
pseudo-lifecycles of cohorts of individuals the interpretation that 
should be given to the resulting elasticity is that it is the response to 
anticipated variation in prices across the lifecycle. The policy elastic-
ity of interest here is the conventional Marshallian one that tells us 
the response to unanticipated changes in price.
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Safer et al. [19] use the National Longitudinal Study of 
Youth (NLSY) cohort study to estimate the response to price 
(and advertising) changes across the drinking distribution. The 
data are only concerned with those aged 18–29, so the results 
may not be generalisable to the whole population. The ACCRA 
price data is used. The authors use conditional quantile regres-
sion, and ind no statistically signiicant relationship between 
price and consumption at any quantile and there was no statisti-
cal diference between estimates for any pair of deciles.
Byrnes et al. [20] used 3 years of Australian household 
cross-section survey data, and a double-hurdle quantile regres-
sion technique, to estimate the price elasticity of demand for 
alcohol. In contrast to Manning et al., the authors ind that 
heavy drinkers are more responsive to price compared to 
lighter drinkers, and it is the lightest drinkers whose demand 
is perfectly inelastic. They also ind a relatively high average 
price elasticity, close to − 1, which is much higher than the 
estimates found in the meta-analyses. The authors suggest that 
this inding could be speciic to Australia and not generalis-
able to other countries. The authors also discuss the possibil-
ity of switching to cheaper alcohol products to mitigate price 
increase, but no analysis is carried out to test this possibility.
Gruenewald et al. [21] use time-series Swedish alcohol 
retail data from 1984 to 1994 to examine the impact of a 
change in the alcohol duty rates on alcohol quantity and 
quality demand. In 1992, the Swedish alcohol regulator, Sys-
tembolaget, changed the structure of duties such that bever-
ages were taxed based on alcoholic strength rather than as 
a percentage of pre-tax price. The duty change led to a nar-
rower distribution of prices for wine and spirits, but a wider 
distribution of prices for beer. The authors deine quality by 
the relative price of the drink, and assign drinks into three 
categories—high, medium and low quality. This is done for 
three drink types—beer, wine and spirits—giving nine dif-
ferent types. However, the study uses only time-series data, 
with the dependent variable being monthly sales by drink 
type, giving 120 observations for each type. The price vari-
able is a price index constructed from the unweighted aver-
age price for each of the nine drink types.
Data
The data used in this paper come from 13 years of nationally 
representative, cross-sectional surveys: the UK Expenditure 
and Food Survey (EFS) 2001–2007, and its successor, the 
Living Costs and Food Survey 2008–2013. The surveys 
are a combination of a household interview and a 2-week 
expenditure diary. Detailed information on expenditure is 
recorded on alcoholic drinks, including information about 
the quantity (in millilitres) of alcoholic drinks purchased. 
Alcohol is recorded for 25 disaggregated premise type/
drink type combinations—for example, on-trade/fortiied 
wine. The consumption of drinks by type were converted 
into units of ethanol using the alcohol strengths reported in 
Purshouse et al. [16]. The diaries are recorded by individual 
expenditures within the household but we have no informa-
tion on individual consumption, so this paper aggregates 
individual expenditures to the household level because of 
concerns regarding intra-household transfers.
We adopt a double log speciication for demand and only 
households who purchased alcohol (68.4% of all households) 
are included in the study. The reason for zero expenditure is 
not known3 in our data and, in any event, it is not possible to 
use a simple Tobit speciication when the dependent variable 
is in log form. The presumption in our double log speciica-
tion is that there is no price that would turn a drinker into 
a non-drinker (and vice versa) and so non-drinkers simply 
have diferent preferences to drinkers.
We identify our price elasticities from cross-region and 
cross-time (in months) variation in prices that are derived 
from our microdata collapsed into region × time cells. Since 
our dataset is the same dataset that is used to construct the 
sub-indices of the retail prices index from observed expendi-
ture and quantities, this is a natural way of deining prices. 
However, we do not include the lead and lag of consump-
tion since our data is just pooled cross-sections. Implicitly, 
our speciication could be reconciled with the conventional 
rational addiction speciication by treating the omitted leads 
and lags as unobservables, and it deals with the efect of the 
resulting heteroskedasticity on standard errors by estimating 
the used robust methods.
Our survey data contains information on expenditure and 
quantity—so a “unit value” can be calculated by dividing 
expenditure by quantity. However, using unit values as the 
price would yield biased elasticity estimates since much of 
the variation in unit values would be due to variation in the 
‘quality’ of alcohol consumed. That is, a diference in unit 
values across households would arise because of both dif-
ferences in the true price and of diferences in (endogenous) 
quality selection. If heavier drinkers have a taste for cheaper, 
lower ‘quality’ alcohol, then price elasticity estimates will 
be biased away from zero (i.e., will be more elastic).
For this reason, this study uses the month–region average 
price-per-unit of alcohol. Thus, our measure of price captures 
diferential changes over time and across region. To create 
the index for a region, a mean price-per-unit is calculated 
for each household in that region by summing up alcohol 
expenditure and dividing by the total number of alcoholic 
units. The average of these is taken for cells deined by the 
12 regions in the United Kingdom, and for each of the 153 
3 Censored quantile regression, which assumes all zero expenditures 
arise due to price/income reasons in a similar manner to the Tobit 
model, produce broadly similar results.
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months in the survey period.4 Note that since we include 
region ixed efects and month ixed efects, our “price” vari-
able is deined as the regional × time average, and this deini-
tion is immune from the usual endogeneity arguments. We 
assume that prices change in response to changes in produc-
tion costs, as well as tax changes over time.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of per-adult alcohol con-
sumption in the data. The distribution is truncated at the 
99th percentile to compress the x axis, but this is not done 
in our statistical analysis. The distribution has a long right-
hand tail, but it is clear that while the majority of households 
drink moderately.
Figure 2 illustrates that the heaviest drinking quintile drink 
proportionately more of their units in the of-trade (i.e., at 
home). The absolute levels of consumption are still higher in 
the on-trade for the heaviest drinking quintile compared to the 
lightest drinking quintile. Figure 2 also shows the mean price 
per unit paid by each drinking quintile. As reported in the liter-
ature, the heaviest drinkers tend to pay less per unit of alcohol.
Further summary statistics are provided in Table 1. It 
shows that there is little diference in characteristics across 
drinking quintiles, although the heaviest quintile spend more 
on average, and have slightly fewer adults and children in 
the household.
Methods
In contrast to Purshouse et al. [16] who do not account for 
Koenker and Hallock [17] in terms of estimating the demand 
equation separately for light, moderate and heavy drinkers, 
this paper uses conditional quantile regression, which seeks 
to minimise the (weighted) absolute deviations, in contrast 
to OLS which minimises the unweighted squared deviations. 
The method uses all the data simultaneously and simply var-
ies the weights given to each observation across deciles. 
Conditional quantile regression essentially provides the dif-
ference between the conditional distributions at the given 
quantile. As a robustness check, we also use unconditional 
quantile regression. This method, developed by Firpo et al. 
[22], attempts to better estimate the marginal efects across 
the distribution using the recentered influence function 
(RIF). Policymakers are likely to be more interested in the 
unconditional distribution than the conditional distribution, 
because the policy is naturally concerned with those who are 
unconditionally heavy drinkers, rather than those who are 
heavy drinkers, by virtue of their observed characteristics. 
A discussion of the diferences between unconditional and 
conditional quantile regression is provided by Borah and 
Basu [23]. In any case, there are no substantive diferences 
between the estimates generated by conditional quantile 
regression compared to unconditional quantile regression.
To estimate the price elasticity of quantity demanded, we 
use the double-log model
which predicts the units Q consumed by household h in 
region r at time t as a function of: price P , which varies only 
by r and t; total per capita weekly expenditure Y ; the number 
of adults in the household A ; and other control variables Z
hrt
 
which include the number of children in the household, the 
age of the oldest household member, a linear time trend, 
and monthly and regional ixed efects. 휐
hrt
 is an error term 
which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. 
Because the double-log model is used, 훽
1
 can be interpreted 
as the price elasticity of quantity demanded of alcohol. It is 
(1)
ln Qhrt = 훼 + 훽1 ln Prt + 휂1 ln Yhrt + 훿1 ln Ahrt + 휸
�
1
Z
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Fig. 1  Distribution of per capita expenditure on units of alcohol
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Fig. 2  Diferences in price and drinking location by quintile
4 An alternative, where the regional element of the price index is 
removed to generate a single price index for the United Kingdom, is 
tested and reported in the “Appendix”. The results are broadly similar.
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expected that 훽
1
 is negative. Similarly, 휂
1
 can be interpreted 
as the total expenditure (income) elasticity, and it is expected 
that alcohol is a necessity such that 0 < �
1
< 1.
The double-log model naturally excludes any household 
that does not purchase alcohol. There are many reasons why 
we might observe non-drinking households in a cross-section 
survey dataset. The log speciication precludes the use of Tobit 
estimation but, for robustness, a censored conditional quantile 
regression was also estimated, and yielded similar results. We 
further estimate the demand for on-premise and of-premise 
alcohol separately, with both prices featuring on the right-hand 
side, to test for substitution or complementarity between con-
sumption at the two locations.
We also consider the quality of alcohol consumed. Our 
work on quality is based upon Deaton [24], which in turn 
builds on the seminal work by Prais and Houthakker [25]. Dea-
ton’s work uses clusters to deine prices, which for the purpose 
of this work will be regions r at time t . True price variation is 
assumed not to occur within a cluster, such that all individuals 
in region r at time t face the same underlying price. However, 
they can select quality q . If we write expenditure as the prod-
uct of price, quantity and quality, then Xhrt = PrtQhrtqhrt . The 
theory begins with unit values, calculated by dividing expendi-
ture by quantity. The unit value V is then given as
which shows that the unit value is a combination of under-
lying price and an endogenously selected quality. As with 
Deaton, this can be rewritten as ln Vhrt = ln Prt + ln qhrt . The 
price elasticity of quality demanded can be found by difer-
entiating this with respect to ln P
rt
 , which implies
where 휀
q
 is the price elasticity of quality demanded so 
that when price increases by 1%, the unit value increases 
by (1+휀
q
)%. To estimate the price elasticity of quality 
demanded, the regression equation is speciied as
(2)Vhrt =
Xhrt
Qhrt
=
PrtQhrtqhrt
Qhrt
= Prtqhrt
휕 ln Vhrt
휕 ln Prt
= 1 + 휀q
where the same variables are used on the right-hand side 
as in the quantity demand equation. The price elasticity of 
quality demanded is calculated as (훽
2
− 1) . It is expected that 
this price elasticity of quality demanded is negative, such 
that when prices increases consumers switch to lower qual-
ity alternatives, but that 훽
2
 is itself positive. 휂
2
 is expected 
to be positive since quality is expected to be a normal good. 
It is not a priori obvious whether it should be a luxury or a 
necessity.
Because we want to know how quality substitution occurs 
across the (quantity) distribution, the quality demand equation 
shown is estimated as a quantile regression, using the weights 
generated in the quantity quantile regression. Estimation using 
quantile regression on Eq. 3 would show how increase in price 
is passed on to unit values across the unit value distribution 
rather than the drinking distribution. The quality quantile 
regression is a quantile regression using weights, where the 
weights w at quantile τ are determined as
and Q̂hrt is the predicted value of the dependent variable 
Qhrt at quantile τ using quantile regression. Using the same 
weights from the quantity regression in the quality regres-
sion allows us to estimate the price elasticity of quality over 
the drinking distribution.
Results
The tables presented in this section show, for brevity, only 
the price and income coeicients. Full results tables can be 
found in the “Appendix”. The results for the quantity deci-
sion are shown in Table 2—estimated by OLS (irst column) 
and by quantile regression (in subsequent columns). These 
conirm our prior that price elasticity of demand at the top of 
the drinking distribution is less elastic than at the bottom of 
(3)
ln V
hrt
= 훼 + 훽
2
ln P
rt
+ 휂
2
ln Y
hrt
+ 훿
2
ln A
hrt
+ 휸
2
�
Z + 휃
hrt
(4)whrt =
{
� if Qhrt ⩽
�Qhrt
1 − � if Qhrt >
�Qhrt
Table 1  Summary statistics
Variable All respondents Drinking quintile (adjusted for number of adults)
1 (lightest) 2 3 4 5 (heaviest)
Weekly per-adult units 17.25 1.9 5.77 11.32 20.18 47.15
On-premise units 4.55 1.12 2.24 3.69 5.75 9.95
Of-premise units 12.71 0.78 3.53 7.63 14.43 37.2
Per-adult total weekly expenditure (£) 142.67 128.74 130.68 138.13 147.67 168.2
Number of adults 1.92 2.02 1.94 1.94 1.92 1.76
Number of children 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.6 0.59 0.52
Age of oldest household member 51.72 52.92 51.79 51.27 50.81 51.82
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the distribution: the lower quartile’s price elasticity is − 0.709 
compared to − 0.346 for the upper quartile. Unlike some ind-
ings in the literature, we ind that no part of the drinking 
distribution is perfectly price inelastic. The income (total 
expenditure per capita) elasticity is positive, but less than 
1, so that alcohol is a normal good. The efect of income is 
fairly constant across the drinking distribution. The positive 
coeicient on the log number of adults in the “Appendix” 
shows that for every extra adult in the household, household 
consumption increases but at a decreasing rate. The monthly 
ixed efects show that consumption increases signiicantly 
in November and December, whilst the North East and North 
West drink signiicantly more than any other region.
The results for on- and of-premise alcohol are presented 
in Table 2b and c, respectively. They suggest that there is 
zero cross-price elasticity of demand. The demand for of-
premise alcohol is more price elastic than the demand for 
on-premise alcohol. Perhaps surprisingly, the income elas-
ticity is lower for on-premise alcohol. The detailed results 
in the “Appendix” show that seasonal efect is stronger in 
of-premise alcohol, with alcohol consumption increasing by 
30% in December compared to January. As might perhaps 
be expected, households with more children consume less 
alcohol, especially on-trade alcohol (Figs. 3, 4, 5).
The results for the price and income elasticity of quality 
are shown in Table 3—again estimated by OLS (irst column) 
and then by quantile regression. Note that these are estimated 
by quantiles of the quantity distribution—that is we use the 
same weights that are derived for the quantity equations. It 
is important to remember that the parameters shown below 
are the efect of price increases on price paid per unit, and as 
such the quality elasticities are calculated as 훽
2
− 1 . The results 
show that the price elasticity of quality demanded increase 
with consumption, such that heavier drinkers respond more to 
price changes by decreasing quality. The estimated price elas-
ticity of demand (for all alcohol) by vingtile is shown in Fig. 6.
Discussion
The results presented in this paper show convincingly that 
heavier drinkers are less responsive to price than moder-
ate drinkers, especially for of-premise alcohol. The results 
Table 2  Log price and income elasticities of log quantity demanded (a) all alcohol, (b) on-premise, (c) of-premise
Signiicance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
(a)
 Price − 0.538*** 
(0.025)
− 0.709*** 
(0.053)
− 0.504*** 
(0.039)
− 0.346*** 
(0.034)
− 0.232*** 
(0.037)
− 0.176*** (0.043)
 Income 0.344*** (0.014) 0.352*** (0.015) 0.388*** (0.011) 0.381*** (0.010) 0.340*** (0.010) 0.321*** (0.012)
 Observations 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069
(b)
 On-premise price − 0.410*** 
(0.028)
− 0.455*** 
(0.049)
− 0.484*** 
(0.046)
− 0.361*** 
(0.047)
 − 0.271*** 
(0.049)
− 0.273*** (0.059)
 Of-premise 
price
0.040 (0.043) 0.081 (0.086) 0.044 (0.080) − 0.021 (0.083) − 0.073 (0.086) − 0.067 (0.104)
 Income 0.130*** (0.020) 0.149*** (0.016) 0.150*** (0.015) 0.128*** (0.015) 0.112*** (0.016) 0.140*** (0.019)
 Observations 36,881 36,881 36,881 36,881 36,881 36,881
(c)
 On-premise price 0.041** (0.018) 0.060 (0.044) 0.050 (0.038) − 0.029 (0.037) − 0.000 (0.041) 0.036 (0.047)
 Of-premise 
price
− 0.657*** 
(0.066)
− 0.881*** 
(0.079)
− 0.727*** 
(0.068)
 − 0.460*** 
(0.066)
− 0.325*** 
(0.073)
− 0.222*** (0.083)
 Income 0.311*** (0.013) 0.322*** (0.014) 0.340*** (0.012) 0.3442*** (0.012) 0.304*** (0.013) 0.286*** (0.014)
 Observations 41,572 41,572 41,572 41,572 41,572 41,572
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seem plausible, and the OLS estimate for the price elasticity 
of demand for all alcohol lies within the range of the esti-
mates found in the meta-analyses. The results also show that 
heavier drinkers respond to price increase by substituting 
with cheaper alcohol, which suggests that lighter drinkers 
are more brand loyal and do not choose their alcoholic bev-
erages based on minimising price per unit paid.
These are important indings—the quantity results show 
that price-based measures will have little efect in reduc-
ing heavy consumption because of their small price elastic-
ity, whilst simultaneously having a large negative efect on 
consumer surplus for the light drinking majority, because 
of their large price elasticity. Because heavy drinkers miti-
gate price increase by switching to lower quality, the price 
increase needed to reduce consumption is higher than might 
be expected when considering the mean elasticity.
The results of this paper have profound implications in 
the debate around minimum unit pricing. Modelling work 
on the efects of minimum pricing has used price elasticities 
where either heavy drinkers were more responsive [16] or at 
least as responsive [12] as moderate drinkers. The indings in 
this paper suggest that both studies are likely to have overes-
timated the health gains arising from minimum unit pricing. 
This problem is compounded by the increasing marginal rate 
of harm with consumption. The results from this study show 
that price increase is estimated to have a weaker efect on 
heavier drinkers than on moderate drinkers, so price-based 
alcohol policies may not be the most efective method of 
tackling heavy drinking without penalising moderate drink-
ers. That said, although the proportionate response is small 
for heavier drinkers (if the price goes up by 10% the upper 
quartile of reduce their consumption by 3.5%), the absolute 
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Table 3  Log price and income elasticities of log quality demanded (a) all alcohol, (b) on-premise, (c) of-premise
Signiicance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. Standard Errors in parentheses
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
(a)
 Price 0.577*** (0.015) 0.689*** (0.028) 0.493*** (0.021) 0.349*** (0.020) 0.310*** (0.027) 0.280*** (0.035)
 Income 0.213*** (0.004) 0.206*** (0.007) 0.215*** (0.006) 0.215** (0.006) 0.234*** (0.008) 0.246*** (0.010)
 Observations 54,017 54,017 54,017 54,017 54,017 54,017
(b)
 On-premise price 0.601*** (0.014) 0.427*** (0.015) 0.311*** (0.013) 0.233*** (0.013) 0.176*** (0.017) 0.176*** (0.017)
 Of-premise price − 0.021 (0.025) 0.009 (0.025) 0.027 (0.020) 0.050** (0.020) 0.030 (0.028) 0.023 (0.030)
 Income 0.197*** (0.005) 0.158*** (0.005) 0.164*** (0.004) 0.166*** (0.004) 0.171*** (0.005) 0.179*** (0.005)
 Observations 36,839 36,839 36,839 36,839 36,839 36,839
(c)
 On-premise price − 0.022** (0.010) − 0.018 (0.013) − 0.024** (0.010) − 0.028** (0.011) − 0.021 (0.014) − 0.014 (0.020)
 Of-premise price 0.775*** (0.018) 0.730*** (0.023) 0.611*** (0.018) 0.541*** (0.021) 0.498*** (0.027) 0.461*** (0.036)
 Income 0.134*** (0.003) 0.112*** (0.004) 0.124*** (0.003) 0.140*** (0.004) 0.150*** (0.005) 0.159*** (0.006)
 Observations 41,487 41,487 41,487 41,487 41,487 41,487
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number of units consumed decreases for the heaviest drink-
ers by more than the absolute decrease for lighter drinkers.
The price elasticity of quality demanded estimated in this 
paper shows that heavier drinkers respond to price increase 
by switching to lower quality alcohol. This can either be in 
the form of switching from on-premise alcohol consump-
tion to of-premise alcohol consumption (where the unit 
value is lower), or by switching from one brand of drink 
to a cheaper alternative. While this makes little diference 
to health policy, unless of course lower quality alcohol is 
worse for health5, it has a major implication in the efect of 
price increases. If the heaviest drinkers absorb price increase 
by substituting towards lower quality alcohol, then price 
increase is less efective. Minimum unit pricing, which sets a 
loor price, may eliminate the possibility of absorbing price 
increase by switching to lower quality alcohol.
There are several limitations to this study. First, the 
fact that the data is collected at the household level means 
that some assumption must be made regarding the intra-
household allocation of alcohol. Even though individual-
level expenditure diaries are recorded, this is not suicient 
to resolve this problem because of the possibility of intra-
household transfers. This study thus implicitly assumes that 
the consumption of alcohol purchased within a household is 
split evenly.6 There may be cases where a household appears 
in the upper 5% of drinking households, while a very heavy 
drinker living in a large house with non-drinkers may not 
be included in the upper 5% of drinking households. This is 
perhaps unlikely to happen in a large amount of households 
because it relies on the other members of the household not 
drinking. The General Household Survey 2006 asks indi-
viduals how much alcohol they consume, and shows that 
in two-person households there is a strong positive corre-
lation (0.30, p < 0.001) between individuals’ weekly units. 
This suggests that heavy drinking households are likely to 
be comprised of heavy drinking individuals rather than one 
heavy and one light drinker. Analysis at the individual level 
would be biased due to intra-household transfers, so would 
have its own limitations.
Second, stockpiling may mean that households purchase 
more at times when alcohol prices are lower, such as around 
December, but not consume it during the expenditure period. 
This is only relevant to of-premise alcohol consumption. 
Ideally, a longer diary window would reduce the problem of 
stockpiling, although this would likely cause lower response 
rates to the survey. Another option is to measure existing 
stocks at the start and end period to accurately measure con-
sumption, as is done in a survey used by Gibson and Kim [26].
Third, under-recording of alcohol may bias the estimates. 
It is known that totals from household surveys relect only 
around a half of alcohol clearances (see, for example, Boniface 
and Shelton [27]). However, it is not possible to know whether 
the under-recording is constant across the distribution, whether 
lighter drinkers under-record more than heavy drinkers, or the 
opposite. Under the irst scenario, the estimates from this paper 
would be unbiased since constant under-recording in a double-
log system simply appears as in the constant term. Similarly, 
measurement error in quantity may lead to bias because quan-
tity is used to calculate price. However, no alternative measure 
of price is available in the survey.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that heavier drinkers respond less to 
price in terms of quantity. If the price of alcohol increases by 
10%, the lightest quartile of drinkers reduce their consump-
tion by 7.1% compared to 3.5% for the heaviest quartile of 
drinkers. It is the irst paper to examine quality substitution 
across the drinking distribution, and inds that heavier drink-
ers respond to price by changing quality more than lighter 
drinkers do.
The results suggest that price-based policies may not be 
efective at reducing consumption amongst heavy drinkers 
without penalising lighter drinkers. This is especially true 
if heavy drinkers can absorb price increase by decreasing 
quality. However, the presumed nonlinearity in consump-
tion and harm means that a small proportional reduction in 
consumption amongst heavy drinkers could still have a large 
efect in terms of health and healthcare costs. The results also 
show that current modelling work on minimum unit pricing 
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5 The inding might be interesting when looking at the shift from 
on-premise to of-premise consumption. A shift to the of-trade may 
change the probability of drink-driving or alcohol-related violence.
6 Our demand speciication satisies the conditions for exact aggre-
gation, and implies constant elasticities. This implies that we would 
get the same estimated elasticities if we weighted the individual data 
together using any arbitrary weights.
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probably overstates the efects by not allowing the price elas-
ticity to vary across the drinking distribution. This means that 
it predicts less consumer surplus loss for moderate drinkers, 
and a greater reduction in consumption in heavy drinkers, 
than would be expected given the results of this paper.
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Appendix
Full regression tables are found in Tables 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 
Table 10 shows the regression results using a monthly price 
index (with no regional variation).
Table 4  Log price and income efects on log quantity demanded: all alcohol
Signiicance: *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Log price per unit − 0.538*** (0.025) − 0.709*** (0.053) − 0.504*** (0.039) − 0.346*** (0.034) − 0.232*** (0.037) − 0.176*** (0.043)
Log per capita total 
expenditure
0.344*** (0.014) 0.352*** (0.015) 0.388*** (0.011) 0.381*** (0.010) 0.340*** (0.010) 0.321*** (0.012)
Log number of adults 0.714*** (0.022) 0.783*** (0.022) 0.762*** (0.016) 0.699*** (0.014) 0.625*** (0.015) 0.578*** (0.018)
Number of children − 0.062*** (0.007) − 0.077*** (0.010) − 0.059*** (0.007) − 0.057*** (0.006) − 0.048*** (0.007) − 0.044*** (0.008)
Age of oldest household 
member
− 0.001 (0.001) − 0.003*** (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000)
February 0.096*** (0.017) 0.139*** (0.044) 0.111*** (0.032) 0.112*** (0.028) 0.111*** (0.030) 0.073** (0.036)
March 0.099** (0.032) 0.106** (0.043) 0.109*** (0.032) 0.124*** (0.028) 0.102*** (0.030) 0.067* (0.035)
April 0.133*** (0.019) 0.165*** (0.043) 0.148*** (0.031) 0.157*** (0.027) 0.107*** (0.029) 0.015 (0.035)
May 0.126*** (0.015) 0.155*** (0.043) 0.123*** (0.031) 0.134*** (0.027) 0.134*** (0.030) 0.095*** (0.035)
June 0.138*** (0.020) 0.199*** (0.043) 0.160*** (0.031) 0.142*** (0.027) 0.145*** (0.029) 0.099*** (0.035)
July 0.148*** (0.016) 0.195*** (0.042) 0.156*** (0.031) 0.127*** (0.027) 0.134*** (0.029) 0.106*** (0.034)
August 0.150*** (0.017) 0.183*** (0.042) 0.152*** (0.031) 0.142*** (0.027) 0.150*** (0.029) 0.067* (0.034)
September 0.095*** (0.023) 0.129*** (0.042) 0.101*** (0.031) 0.104*** (0.027) 0.113*** (0.029) 0.040 (0.034)
October 0.111*** (0.027) 0.153*** (0.042) 0.137*** (0.031) 0.125*** (0.027) 0.119*** (0.029) 0.042 (0.034)
November 0.221*** (0.022) 0.255*** (0.042) 0.226*** (0.031) 0.214*** (0.027) 0.234*** (0.029) 0.198*** (0.034)
December 0.377*** (0.031) 0.450*** (0.043) 0.390*** (0.031) 0.356*** (0.027) 0.357*** (0.030) 0.310*** (0.035)
North West − 0.019*** (0.001) − 0.063 (0.048) − 0.017 (0.035) 0.050* (0.030) 0.016 (0.033) 0.015 (0.039)
Yorkshire and Humber − 0.063*** (0.001) − 0.114** (0.049) − 0.069* (0.036) − 0.010 (0.031) − 0.011 (0.034) − 0.022 (0.040)
East Midlands − 0.126*** (0.002) − 0.192*** (0.051) − 0.147*** (0.037) − 0.093*** (0.032) − 0.049 (0.035) − 0.033 (0.041)
West Midlands − 0.141*** (0.002) − 0.245*** (0.049) − 0.131*** (0.036) − 0.108*** (0.032) − 0.051 (0.034) − 0.042 (0.040)
Eastern − 0.237*** (0.003) − 0.320*** (0.050) − 0.255*** (0.036) − 0.190*** (0.032) − 0.127*** (0.034) − 0.100** (0.040)
London − 0.185*** (0.006) − 0.253*** (0.053) − 0.226*** (0.039) − 0.177*** − 0.132*** (0.037) − 0.117*** (0.043)
(0.034)
South East − 0.199*** (0.004) − 0.255*** (0.048) − 0.232*** (0.035) − 0.160*** (0.030) − 0.122*** (0.033) − 0.078** (0.039)
South West − 0.179*** (0.002) − 0.246*** (0.049) − 0.188*** (0.036) − 0.121*** (0.031) − 0.129*** (0.034) − 0.110*** (0.040)
Wales − 0.092*** (0.001) − 0.119** (0.055) − 0.114*** (0.040) − 0.064* (0.035) − 0.021 (0.038) − 0.026 (0.045)
Scotland − 0.057*** (0.003) − 0.076 (0.050) − 0.072** (0.037) − 0.032 (0.032) − 0.011 (0.035) − 0.028 (0.041)
Northern Ireland − 0.024*** (0.007) − 0.065 (0.055) − 0.043 (0.040) 0.005 (0.035) − 0.057 (0.038) − 0.029 (0.045)
Linear monthly time 
trend
− 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.000*** (0.000)
Constant 3.601*** (0.072) 3.614*** (0.216) 3.356*** (0.158) 3.367*** (0.138) 3.588*** (0.150) 3.769*** (0.176)
Observations 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069
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Table 5  Log price and income efects on log quantity demanded: on-premise alcohol
Signiicance: *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Log price per unit on − 0.410*** (0.028) − 0.455*** (0.049) − 0.484*** (0.046) − 0.361*** (0.047) − 0.271*** (0.049) − 0.273*** (0.059)
Log price per unit of 0.040 (0.043) 0.081 (0.086) 0.044 (0.080) − 0.021 (0.083) − 0.073 (0.086) − 0.067 (0.104)
Log per capita total 
expenditure
0.130*** (0.020) 0.149*** (0.016) 0.150*** (0.015) 0.128*** (0.015) 0.112*** (0.016) 0.140*** (0.019)
Log number of adults 0.691*** (0.017) 0.766*** (0.022) 0.823*** (0.021) 0.729*** (0.021) 0.552*** (0.022) 0.500*** (0.027)
Number of children − 0.150*** (0.006) − 0.158*** (0.010) − 0.167*** (0.009) − 0.159*** (0.009) − 0.148*** (0.010) − 0.142*** (0.012)
Age of oldest household 
member
− 0.010*** (0.001) − 0.013*** (0.001) − 0.012*** (0.001) − 0.008*** (0.001) − 0.006*** (0.001) − 0.004*** (0.001)
February 0.040 (0.030) 0.046 (0.043) 0.022 (0.040) 0.075* (0.042) 0.086** (0.043) 0.028 (0.052)
March 0.038 (0.024) 0.034 (0.043) 0.021 (0.040) 0.053 (0.041) 0.109** (0.043) 0.063 (0.052)
April 0.097*** (0.029) 0.128*** (0.042) 0.120*** (0.039) 0.087** (0.040) 0.089** (0.042) 0.091* (0.051)
May 0.061** (0.026) 0.064 (0.042) 0.059 (0.040) 0.082** (0.041) 0.046 (0.042) 0.048 (0.051)
June 0.036 (0.043) − 0.002 (0.042) 0.027 (0.039) 0.092** (0.040) 0.069* (0.042) 0.030 (0.051)
July 0.072** (0.027) 0.039 (0.042) 0.092** (0.039) 0.096** (0.040) 0.070* (0.042) 0.045 (0.050)
August 0.095*** (0.024) 0.084** (0.042) 0.102*** (0.039) 0.123*** (0.040) 0.099** (0.042) 0.040 (0.050)
September 0.039 (0.025) 0.058 (0.042) 0.027 (0.039) 0.052 (0.040) 0.034 (0.042) 0.006 (0.051)
October 0.024 (0.034) − 0.005 (0.042) 0.023 (0.039) 0.072* (0.041) 0.090** (0.042) 0.051 (0.051)
November 0.026 (0.024) 0.033 (0.042) 0.005 (0.039) 0.049 (0.040) 0.068 (0.042) 0.046 (0.051)
December 0.107*** (0.033) 0.120*** (0.043) 0.111*** (0.040) 0.101** (0.042) 0.147*** (0.043) 0.110** (0.052)
Northwest − 0.100*** (0.004) − 0.094** (0.047) − 0.159*** (0.044) − 0.115** (0.045) − 0.022 (0.047) 0.049 (0.057)
Yorkshire and Humber − 0.108*** (0.004) − 0.110** (0.049) − 0.152*** (0.045) − 0.139*** (0.047) − 0.005 (0.048) 0.021 (0.058)
East Midlands − 0.246*** (0.004) − 0.273*** (0.050) − 0.299*** (0.047) − 0.274*** (0.048) − 0.162*** (0.050) − 0.116* (0.060)
West Midlands − 0.190*** (0.004) − 0.173*** (0.049) − 0.234*** (0.046) − 0.222*** (0.047) − 0.122** (0.049) − 0.099* (0.059)
Eastern − 0.368*** (0.009) − 0.349*** (0.050) − 0.433*** (0.047) − 0.431*** (0.049) − 0.319*** (0.050) − 0.223*** (0.061)
London − 0.208*** (0.015) − 0.211*** (0.056) − 0.255*** (0.052) − 0.234*** (0.054) − 0.112** (0.056) − 0.090 (0.068)
Southeast − 0.352*** (0.011) − 0.319*** (0.049) − 0.431*** (0.046) − 0.444*** (0.047) − 0.288*** (0.049) − 0.220*** (0.059)
Southwest − 0.312*** (0.007) − 0.294*** (0.049) − 0.365*** (0.046) − 0.372*** (0.047) − 0.243*** (0.049) − 0.234*** (0.059)
Wales − 0.138*** (0.003) − 0.172*** (0.055) − 0.181*** (0.051) − 0.152*** (0.053) − 0.128** (0.055) − 0.099 (0.066)
Scotland − 0.220*** (0.009) − 0.185*** (0.052) − 0.254*** (0.048) − 0.282*** (0.050) − 0.194*** (0.051) − 0.191*** (0.062)
Northern Ireland − 0.104*** (0.012) − 0.141** (0.056) − 0.128** (0.053) − 0.136** (0.054) − 0.020 (0.056) 0.019 (0.068)
Linear monthly time 
trend
− 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.003*** (0.000) − 0.003*** (0.000) − 0.003*** (0.000)
Constant 4.051*** (0.180) 3.269*** (0.333) 4.405*** (0.311) 4.854*** (0.321) 5.211*** (0.331) 5.304*** (0.401)
Observations 36,881 36,881 36,881 36,881 36,881 36,881
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Table 6  Log price and income efects on log quantity demanded: of-premise alcohol
Signiicance: *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Log price per unit on 0.041** (0.018) 0.060 (0.044) 0.050 (0.038) − 0.029 (0.037) − 0.000 (0.041) 0.036 (0.047)
Log price per unit of − 0.657*** (0.066) − 0.881*** (0.079) − 0.727*** (0.068) − 0.460*** (0.066) − 0.325*** (0.073) − 0.222*** (0.083)
Log per capita total 
expenditure
0.311*** (0.013) 0.322*** (0.014) 0.340*** (0.012) 0.342*** (0.012) 0.304*** (0.013) 0.286*** (0.014)
Log number of adults 0.468*** (0.019) 0.459*** (0.020) 0.519*** (0.018) 0.552*** (0.017) 0.525*** (0.019) 0.508*** (0.021)
Number of children − 0.016* (0.008) − 0.018** (0.009) − 0.016** (0.008) − 0.013* (0.007) − 0.015* (0.008) − 0.019** (0.009)
Age of oldest household 
member
0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.000) 0.007*** (0.000) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001)
February 0.111*** (0.030) 0.164*** (0.041) 0.116*** (0.036) 0.117*** (0.035) 0.120*** (0.038) 0.050 (0.043)
March 0.086** (0.030) 0.118*** (0.040) 0.100*** (0.035) 0.082** (0.034) 0.085** (0.037) 0.003 (0.043)
April 0.082*** (0.023) 0.130*** (0.040) 0.096*** (0.034) 0.106*** (0.033) 0.076** (0.036) − 0.044 (0.042)
May 0.090*** (0.018) 0.140*** (0.040) 0.093*** (0.034) 0.096*** (0.033) 0.135*** (0.036) 0.077* (0.042)
June 0.119*** (0.020) 0.182*** (0.039) 0.120*** (0.034) 0.110*** (0.033) 0.108*** (0.036) 0.052 (0.041)
July 0.103*** (0.025) 0.119*** (0.039) 0.115*** (0.034) 0.098*** (0.033) 0.109*** (0.036) 0.039 (0.041)
August 0.096*** (0.025) 0.122*** (0.039) 0.098*** (0.034) 0.092*** (0.033) 0.116*** (0.036) 0.014 (0.041)
September 0.063*** (0.017) 0.068* (0.039) 0.089*** (0.034) 0.074** (0.033) 0.088** (0.036) − 0.007 (0.042)
October 0.102*** (0.028) 0.119*** (0.039) 0.116*** (0.034) 0.096*** (0.033) 0.105*** (0.036) − 0.006 (0.041)
November 0.221*** (0.024) 0.257*** (0.038) 0.226*** (0.033) 0.209*** (0.032) 0.256*** (0.035) 0.188*** (0.040)
December 0.376*** (0.029) 0.442*** (0.039) 0.396*** (0.033) 0.376*** (0.032) 0.389*** (0.035) 0.295*** (0.041)
Northwest 0.037*** (0.005) 0.040 (0.044) 0.048 (0.038) 0.056 (0.037) 0.030 (0.040) − 0.008 (0.046)
Yorkshire and Humber − 0.016*** (0.005) − 0.020 (0.046) − 0.020 (0.039) − 0.017 (0.038) − 0.028 (0.042) − 0.030 (0.048)
East Midlands − 0.055*** (0.005) − 0.094** (0.047) − 0.078* (0.040) − 0.067* (0.039) − 0.022 (0.043) 0.000 (0.049)
West Midlands − 0.068*** (0.005) − 0.088* (0.046) − 0.053 (0.039) − 0.044 (0.038) − 0.011 (0.042) − 0.031 (0.048)
Eastern − 0.104*** (0.010) − 0.131*** (0.047) − 0.111*** (0.040) − 0.097** (0.039) − 0.074* (0.043) − 0.079 (0.049)
London − 0.136*** (0.016) − 0.166*** (0.052) − 0.169*** (0.045) − 0.136*** (0.044) − 0.115** (0.048) − 0.130** (0.055)
Southeast − 0.075*** (0.012) − 0.081* (0.045) − 0.090** (0.039) − 0.085** (0.038) − 0.052 (0.042) − 0.052 (0.048)
Southwest − 0.056*** (0.008) − 0.055 (0.045) − 0.072* (0.039) − 0.057 (0.038) − 0.077* (0.042) − 0.094* (0.048)
Wales − 0.030*** (0.004) − 0.048 (0.051) − 0.016 (0.044) − 0.020 (0.043) 0.002 (0.047) − 0.026 (0.054)
Scotland 0.037*** (0.008) 0.042 (0.047) 0.046 (0.041) 0.039 (0.040) 0.048 (0.044) 0.012 (0.050)
Northern Ireland 0.038*** (0.011) 0.069 (0.053) 0.045 (0.046) 0.056 (0.044) − 0.012 (0.049) − 0.042 (0.056)
Linear monthly time 
trend
− 0.000*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.000*** (0.000) − 0.000** (0.000) − 0.000* (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Constant 3.363*** (0.230) 3.238*** (0.304) 3.411*** (0.263) 3.501*** (0.256) 3.625*** (0.280) 3.614*** (0.321)
Observations 41,572 41,572 41,572 41,572 41,572 41,572
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Table 7  Log price and income efects on log quality demanded: all alcohol
Signiicance: *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Log price per unit 0.577*** (0.015) 0.689*** (0.028) 0.493*** (0.021) 0.349*** (0.020) 0.310*** (0.027) 0.280*** (0.035)
Log per capita total 
expenditure
0.213*** (0.004) 0.206*** (0.007) 0.215*** (0.006) 0.215*** (0.006) 0.234*** (0.008) 0.246*** (0.010)
Log number of adults 0.139*** (0.006) 0.134*** (0.011) 0.171*** (0.008) 0.164*** (0.008) 0.144*** (0.011) 0.148*** (0.015)
Number of children − 0.094*** (0.003) − 0.109*** (0.005) − 0.111*** (0.004) − 0.108*** (0.003) − 0.101*** (0.004) − 0.090*** (0.006)
Age of oldest household 
member
− 0.005*** (0.000) − 0.005*** (0.000) − 0.006*** (0.000) − 0.006*** (0.000) − 0.006*** (0.000) − 0.005*** (0.000)
February − 0.016 (0.013) − 0.017 (0.024) − 0.022 (0.018) − 0.018 (0.020) − 0.001 (0.022) 0.009 (0.028)
March − 0.011 (0.013) − 0.020 (0.023) − 0.027 (0.017) − 0.018 (0.018) 0.003 (0.023) − 0.016 (0.029)
April − 0.020 (0.012) − 0.058** (0.023) − 0.029* (0.017) − 0.024 (0.018) − 0.015 (0.023) 0.027 (0.031)
May − 0.016 (0.013) − 0.022 (0.025) − 0.039** (0.017) − 0.032* (0.018) − 0.002 (0.023) − 0.001 (0.030)
June − 0.028** (0.012) − 0.053** (0.024) − 0.046*** (0.016) − 0.022 (0.018) − 0.006 (0.023) 0.000 (0.029)
July − 0.026** (0.012) − 0.057** (0.023) − 0.045*** (0.017) − 0.049*** (0.018) − 0.021 (0.021) 0.000 (0.028)
August − 0.026** (0.012) − 0.056** (0.023) − 0.043** (0.017) − 0.035* (0.018) − 0.027 (0.022) − 0.001 (0.028)
September − 0.018 (0.012) − 0.036 (0.023) − 0.032* (0.017) − 0.031* (0.019) 0.002 (0.025) 0.031 (0.033)
October − 0.034*** (0.012) − 0.071*** (0.023) − 0.055*** (0.017) − 0.040** (0.019) − 0.011 (0.022) 0.025 (0.032)
November − 0.049*** (0.012) − 0.087*** (0.024) − 0.083*** (0.016) − 0.071*** (0.018) − 0.049** (0.024) − 0.048 (0.031)
December − 0.073*** (0.013) − 0.127*** (0.023) − 0.119*** (0.016) − 0.105*** (0.018) − 0.084*** (0.023) − 0.086*** (0.029)
Northwest − 0.017 (0.014) − 0.029 (0.022) − 0.040*** (0.015) − 0.021 (0.016) − 0.004 (0.023) 0.009 (0.031)
Yorkshire and Humber 0.001 (0.014) 0.010 (0.021) 0.004 (0.016) 0.020 (0.016) 0.043* (0.025) 0.036 (0.032)
East Midlands − 0.012 (0.015) − 0.008 (0.023) − 0.018 (0.016) − 0.009 (0.017) 0.014 (0.024) 0.008 (0.031)
West Midlands − 0.001 (0.014) 0.022 (0.022) 0.004 (0.017) 0.003 (0.017) 0.009 (0.023) 0.028 (0.032)
Eastern − 0.023 (0.014) − 0.024 (0.023) − 0.032* (0.016) − 0.036** (0.016) − 0.024 (0.023) − 0.035 (0.032)
London − 0.002 (0.015) − 0.027 (0.025) 0.006 (0.017) 0.057*** (0.019) 0.098*** (0.025) 0.109*** (0.034)
Southeast − 0.035** (0.014) − 0.045** (0.022) − 0.055*** (0.016) − 0.031* (0.016) − 0.009 (0.023) 0.003 (0.031)
Southwest − 0.012 (0.014) − 0.009 (0.023) − 0.029* (0.016) − 0.014 (0.015) 0.010 (0.024) 0.006 (0.030)
Wales 0.007 (0.016) − 0.012 (0.027) − 0.019 (0.018) − 0.009 (0.016) 0.021 (0.026) 0.044 (0.035)
Scotland − 0.021 (0.015) − 0.051** (0.025) − 0.056*** (0.016) − 0.046*** (0.017) − 0.035 (0.024) − 0.019 (0.029)
Northern Ireland 0.019 (0.016) − 0.030 (0.030) − 0.013 (0.019) 0.003 (0.021) 0.026 (0.027) 0.057 (0.035)
Linear monthly time 
trend
− 0.000** (0.000) − 0.000*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000)
Constant 0.642*** (0.063) 0.375*** (0.112) 0.984*** (0.084) 1.430*** (0.082) 1.363*** (0.111) 1.314*** (0.143)
Observations 54,017 54,017 54,017 54,017 54,017 54,017
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Table 8  Log price and income efects on log quality demanded: on-premise alcohol
Signiicance: *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Log price per unit on 0.601*** (0.014) 0.427*** (0.015) 0.311*** (0.013) 0.233*** (0.013) 0.176*** (0.017) 0.176*** (0.017)
Log price per unit of − 0.021 (0.025) 0.009 (0.025) 0.027 (0.020) 0.050** (0.020) 0.030 (0.028) 0.023 (0.030)
Log per capita total 
expenditure
0.197*** (0.005) 0.158*** (0.005) 0.164*** (0.004) 0.166*** (0.004) 0.171*** (0.005) 0.179*** (0.005)
Log number of adults 0.051*** (0.006) 0.047*** (0.006) 0.060*** (0.005) 0.076*** (0.005) 0.079*** (0.007) 0.073*** (0.007)
Number of children − 0.032*** (0.003) − 0.029*** (0.003) − 0.028*** (0.002) − 0.030*** (0.002) − 0.026*** (0.003) − 0.022*** (0.004)
Age of oldest household 
member
− 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000)
February − 0.013 (0.012) 0.005 (0.012) − 0.009 (0.010) − 0.012 (0.009) − 0.030** (0.013) − 0.055*** (0.017)
March − 0.012 (0.012) 0.011 (0.012) 0.004 (0.009) − 0.003 (0.010) − 0.030** (0.014) − 0.028* (0.015)
April − 0.010 (0.012) − 0.007 (0.011) 0.001 (0.009) − 0.007 (0.009) − 0.030** (0.014) − 0.025* (0.015)
May − 0.010 (0.012) − 0.007 (0.011) − 0.008 (0.009) − 0.020** (0.009) − 0.033** (0.013) − 0.027** (0.013)
June − 0.022* (0.012) − 0.016 (0.011) − 0.018** (0.009) − 0.020** (0.009) − 0.025** (0.013) − 0.031** (0.013)
July − 0.020* (0.012) − 0.017 (0.011) − 0.014 (0.010) − 0.016* (0.009) − 0.033** (0.014) − 0.043*** (0.014)
August − 0.021* (0.012) 0.003 (0.011) − 0.007 (0.009) − 0.018* (0.009) − 0.029** (0.013) − 0.029** (0.014)
September − 0.010 (0.012) − 0.003 (0.010) − 0.005 (0.009) − 0.010 (0.010) − 0.017 (0.012) − 0.014 (0.013)
October − 0.015 (0.012) − 0.010 (0.011) − 0.021** (0.009) − 0.024*** (0.009) − 0.037*** (0.013) − 0.037** (0.015)
November − 0.013 (0.012) 0.008 (0.013) − 0.007 (0.010) − 0.020** (0.009) − 0.033*** (0.013) − 0.031* (0.016)
December − 0.014 (0.012) 0.012 (0.013) 0.009 (0.010) − 0.007 (0.010) − 0.019 (0.013) − 0.038*** (0.013)
Northwest 0.002 (0.014) 0.005 (0.012) 0.023** (0.010) 0.035*** (0.012) 0.033* (0.018) 0.035** (0.018)
Yorkshire and Humber − 0.004 (0.014) − 0.005 (0.012) 0.009 (0.010) 0.020* (0.012) 0.027 (0.018) 0.037** (0.017)
East Midlands 0.020 (0.014) 0.012 (0.013) 0.037*** (0.011) 0.057*** (0.012) 0.070*** (0.017) 0.094*** (0.015)
West Midlands 0.020 (0.014) 0.019 (0.011) 0.039*** (0.011) 0.053*** (0.012) 0.053*** (0.017) 0.068*** (0.016)
Eastern 0.028* (0.015) 0.043*** (0.014) 0.081*** (0.012) 0.113*** (0.013) 0.133*** (0.018) 0.150*** (0.017)
London 0.040** (0.016) 0.099*** (0.018) 0.135*** (0.014) 0.160*** (0.016) 0.165*** (0.022) 0.180*** (0.021)
Southeast 0.027* (0.014) 0.055*** (0.013) 0.102*** (0.011) 0.136*** (0.013) 0.145*** (0.019) 0.154*** (0.018)
Southwest 0.031** (0.014) 0.038*** (0.013) 0.077*** (0.011) 0.102*** (0.012) 0.115*** (0.018) 0.135*** (0.017)
Wales 0.028* (0.016) 0.034** (0.015) 0.046*** (0.012) 0.059*** (0.013) 0.073*** (0.020) 0.071*** (0.015)
Scotland 0.048*** (0.015) 0.073*** (0.017) 0.103*** (0.013) 0.121*** (0.015) 0.118*** (0.019) 0.117*** (0.021)
Northern Ireland 0.079*** (0.016) 0.141*** (0.016) 0.161*** (0.016) 0.152*** (0.016) 0.140*** (0.023) 0.132*** (0.021)
Linear monthly time 
trend
0.000*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)
Constant 0.745*** (0.096) 1.516*** (0.091) 1.864*** (0.080) 2.066*** (0.079) 2.305*** (0.106) 2.265*** (0.114)
Observations 36,839 36,839 36,839 36,839 36,839 36,839
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Table 9  Log price and income efects on log quality demanded: of-premise
Signiicance: *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Log price per unit on − 0.022** (0.010) − 0.018 (0.013) − 0.024** (0.010) − 0.028** (0.011) − 0.021 (0.014) − 0.014 (0.020)
Log price per unit of 0.775*** (0.018) 0.730*** (0.023) 0.611*** (0.018) 0.541*** (0.021) 0.498*** (0.027) 0.461*** (0.036)
Log per capita total 
expenditure
0.134*** (0.003) 0.112*** (0.004) 0.124*** (0.003) 0.140*** (0.004) 0.150*** (0.005) 0.159*** (0.006)
Log number of adults 0.033*** (0.005) 0.012** (0.006) 0.024*** (0.005) 0.031*** (0.005) 0.036*** (0.007) 0.034*** (0.009)
Number of children − 0.024*** (0.002) − 0.025*** (0.003) − 0.024*** (0.002) − 0.022*** (0.002) − 0.020*** (0.003) − 0.018*** (0.004)
Age of oldest household 
member
− 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000)
February − 0.004 (0.009) − 0.005 (0.012) − 0.008 (0.010) − 0.016 (0.010) − 0.010 (0.015) − 0.015 (0.019)
March 0.003 (0.009) − 0.004 (0.012) 0.001 (0.008) − 0.010 (0.010) − 0.005 (0.013) − 0.020 (0.016)
April − 0.004 (0.009) − 0.013 (0.012) − 0.005 (0.008) − 0.013 (0.010) − 0.012 (0.014) − 0.031* (0.016)
May 0.001 (0.009) 0.008 (0.012) − 0.003 (0.009) − 0.010 (0.010) − 0.018 (0.013) − 0.021 (0.018)
June − 0.003 (0.009) 0.003 (0.012) 0.001 (0.009) − 0.002 (0.010) − 0.020 (0.015) − 0.026 (0.017)
July − 0.005 (0.009) − 0.013 (0.012) − 0.006 (0.009) − 0.015 (0.011) − 0.009 (0.013) − 0.020 (0.016)
August − 0.006 (0.009) − 0.002 (0.012) − 0.008 (0.009) − 0.017* (0.010) − 0.011 (0.012) − 0.024 (0.016)
September 0.000 (0.009) − 0.011 (0.012) − 0.005 (0.008) − 0.006 (0.010) − 0.001 (0.014) − 0.012 (0.019)
October 0.001 (0.009) − 0.003 (0.012) − 0.001 (0.008) − 0.010 (0.010) − 0.017 (0.015) − 0.031** (0.015)
November − 0.008 (0.009) − 0.014 (0.012) − 0.018** (0.008) − 0.018* (0.010) − 0.013 (0.013) − 0.014 (0.018)
December − 0.017* (0.009) − 0.018 (0.013) − 0.018** (0.008) − 0.013 (0.010) − 0.010 (0.013) − 0.037** (0.017)
Northwest − 0.007 (0.010) − 0.008 (0.011) − 0.004 (0.009) 0.000 (0.009) 0.011 (0.013) − 0.015 (0.019)
Yorkshire and Humber − 0.004 (0.010) − 0.006 (0.012) 0.000 (0.009) 0.004 (0.010) 0.012 (0.013) − 0.008 (0.020)
East Midlands − 0.007 (0.010) 0.003 (0.012) 0.007 (0.009) 0.015 (0.009) 0.023 (0.014) 0.005 (0.020)
West Midlands − 0.001 (0.010) 0.003 (0.012) 0.003 (0.010) 0.002 (0.010) − 0.003 (0.015) − 0.018 (0.018)
Eastern − 0.009 (0.010) − 0.001 (0.011) 0.007 (0.010) 0.011 (0.010) 0.023 (0.014) 0.012 (0.022)
London − 0.005 (0.012) 0.002 (0.014) 0.032*** (0.011) 0.051*** (0.012) 0.063*** (0.018) 0.059** (0.024)
Southeast − 0.016 (0.010) − 0.009 (0.012) 0.006 (0.010) 0.013 (0.010) 0.022 (0.015) − 0.005 (0.020)
Southwest − 0.005 (0.010) − 0.007 (0.011) 0.002 (0.009) 0.012 (0.010) 0.024* (0.013) 0.006 (0.019)
Wales 0.003 (0.011) − 0.002 (0.013) 0.001 (0.011) 0.007 (0.012) 0.013 (0.017) − 0.011 (0.021)
Scotland 0.008 (0.011) 0.001 (0.012) 0.013 (0.010) 0.018* (0.011) 0.026* (0.014) − 0.006 (0.020)
Northern Ireland 0.020* (0.012) 0.040*** (0.015) 0.046*** (0.011) 0.045*** (0.011) 0.058*** (0.016) 0.044* (0.023)
Linear monthly time 
trend
0.000*** (0.000) 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 − 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.155** (0.068) 0.453*** (0.089) 0.724*** (0.070) 0.823*** (0.077) 0.822*** (0.104) 0.857*** (0.138)
Observations 41,487 41,487 41,487 41,487 41,487 41,487
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Table 10  Log price and income efects on log quantity demanded: all alcohol (robustness check, monthly price)
Signiicance: *0.1 **0.05 ***0.01. Standard errors in parentheses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95
Log price per unit − 0.570*** (0.071) − 0.762*** (0.155) − 0.560*** (0.116) − 0.423*** (0.101) − 0.314*** (0.108) − 0.272** (0.130)
Log per capita total 
expenditure
0.338*** (0.014) 0.349*** (0.015) 0.385*** (0.011) 0.380*** (0.010) 0.336*** (0.010) 0.322*** (0.013)
Log number of adults 0.712*** (0.023) 0.777*** (0.022) 0.759*** (0.016) 0.704*** (0.014) 0.625*** (0.015) 0.578*** (0.018)
Number of children − 0.060*** (0.007) − 0.075*** (0.010) − 0.060*** (0.007) − 0.058*** (0.006) − 0.048*** (0.007) − 0.045*** (0.008)
Age of oldest household 
member
− 0.000 (0.001) − 0.003*** (0.001) 0.001 (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001)
February 0.098*** (0.018) 0.125*** (0.043) 0.110*** (0.032) 0.117*** (0.028) 0.118*** (0.030) 0.097*** (0.036)
March 0.101*** (0.031) 0.106** (0.043) 0.124*** (0.032) 0.121*** (0.028) 0.107*** (0.030) 0.073** (0.036)
April 0.137*** (0.018) 0.159*** (0.042) 0.165*** (0.031) 0.155*** (0.028) 0.106*** (0.029) 0.027 (0.035)
May 0.122*** (0.021) 0.140*** (0.043) 0.126*** (0.032) 0.123*** (0.028) 0.126*** (0.030) 0.107*** (0.036)
June 0.139*** (0.032) 0.190*** (0.043) 0.158*** (0.032) 0.135*** (0.028) 0.142*** (0.030) 0.104*** (0.036)
July 0.148*** (0.018) 0.190*** (0.042) 0.154*** (0.032) 0.123*** (0.028) 0.127*** (0.029) 0.115*** (0.035)
August 0.151*** (0.017) 0.176*** (0.042) 0.152*** (0.032) 0.135*** (0.028) 0.145*** (0.030) 0.079** (0.035)
September 0.098** (0.033) 0.133*** (0.042) 0.102*** (0.031) 0.098*** (0.027) 0.109*** (0.029) 0.044 (0.035)
October 0.112*** (0.029) 0.148*** (0.043) 0.137*** (0.032) 0.118*** (0.028) 0.124*** (0.030) 0.051 (0.036)
November 0.219*** (0.026) 0.251*** (0.044) 0.230*** (0.033) 0.211*** (0.029) 0.223*** (0.031) 0.194*** (0.037)
December 0.378*** (0.042) 0.445*** (0.047) 0.402*** (0.035) 0.339*** (0.031) 0.343*** (0.033) 0.314*** (0.040)
Northwest − 0.041*** (0.002) − 0.079* (0.047) − 0.038 (0.035) 0.030 (0.031) − 0.007 (0.033) 0.003 (0.039)
Yorkshire and Humber − 0.085*** (0.001) − 0.137*** (0.049) − 0.095*** (0.036) − 0.033 (0.032) − 0.041 (0.034) − 0.025 (0.041)
East Midlands − 0.150*** (0.002) − 0.214*** (0.050) − 0.181*** (0.037) − 0.124*** (0.033) − 0.072** (0.035) − 0.048 (0.042)
West Midlands − 0.166*** (0.002) − 0.284*** (0.049) − 0.155*** (0.036) − 0.133*** (0.032) − 0.078** (0.034) − 0.051 (0.041)
Eastern − 0.302*** (0.004) − 0.404*** (0.049) − 0.329*** (0.036) − 0.243*** (0.032) − 0.175*** (0.034) − 0.122*** (0.041)
London − 0.351*** (0.004) − 0.465*** (0.050) − 0.396*** (0.037) − 0.283*** (0.032) − 0.226*** (0.035) − 0.192*** (0.042)
Southeast − 0.297*** (0.005) − 0.396*** (0.046) − 0.336*** (0.034) − 0.233*** (0.030) − 0.178*** (0.032) − 0.113*** (0.038)
Southwest − 0.216*** (0.003) − 0.275*** (0.048) − 0.237*** (0.036) − 0.159*** (0.032) − 0.155*** (0.034) − 0.130*** (0.040)
Wales − 0.085*** (0.001) − 0.123** (0.055) − 0.120*** (0.041) − 0.065* (0.036) − 0.034 (0.038) − 0.029 (0.046)
Scotland − 0.115*** (0.002) − 0.139*** (0.049) − 0.128*** (0.037) − 0.074** (0.032) − 0.056 (0.034) − 0.043 (0.041)
Northern Ireland − 0.193*** (0.004) − 0.264*** (0.052) − 0.219*** (0.039) − 0.117*** (0.034) − 0.142*** (0.036) − 0.105** (0.043)
Linear monthly time 
trend
− 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.002*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000) − 0.001*** (0.000)
Constant 3.815*** (0.320) 3.909*** (0.598) 3.655*** (0.445) 3.720*** (0.389) 3.970*** (0.417) 4.146*** (0.500)
Observations 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069 54,069
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